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Two concepts of differentiability are shown to underlie two concepts of equi- 
librium for nonatomic economies. The weaker concept of subdifferentiability 
corresponds to Walrasian equilibrium and the stronger concept of Frechet differen- 
tiability to product-exhaustion. Product-exhaustion is shown to be equivalent to a 
definition of economic equilibrium in terms of the rationality of price-taking. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Economies with a (nonatomic) continuum of agents have been introduced 
into economic theory to study game-theoretic approaches to competitive 
equilibrium. (A sampling is Aumann [l, 21 and Dubey et al. [3].) It is the 
purpose of this paper to show that such economies may also be regarded as 
the basis of more traditional approaches to the competitive theory of value. 
Lacking 20th century mathematical developments, the 19th century 
founders of the marginal revolution (e.g., Jevons [4], Walras [lo], and 
Wicksteed [ll]) resorted to the calculus available to them in their mathe- 
matical formulations. But it would be difficult to justify their equilibrium 
equations relating prices of inputs to the corresponding partial derivatives 
of a production function, as the result of individualistic, self-seeking behav- 
ior, when individuals supply significant fractions of the aggregate quantities 
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of inputs traded. For example, the derivative of a production function with 
respect to the labor input, called the marginal product of labor, must be 
implicitly interpreted as the change in output per worker. The derivatives 
must be employed with the understanding that the infinitesimals correspond 
to the operating scale of an individual supplier-precisely a nonatomic 
economy. 
In this paper we “redo” marginal analysis for a simple production 
economy, similar to the traditional corn economy used to illustrate the 
marginal productivity theory of distribution. In a more rigorous manner 
than was possible for the founders of marginal analysis, it will be demon- 
strated that for this simple production economy (i) the marginal productiv- 
ity theory of distribution and the rationality of price-taking behavior are 
equivalent to the existence of a gradient of the production function (Theo- 
rems 1,2); (ii) competitive equilibrium theory is well founded if the produc- 
tion function exhibits constant returns to scale (Theorem 3); (iii) the 
concept of Walrasian equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a sub- 
gradient, rather than a gradient, of the production function (Propositions 1, 
2). 
The point of departure for this analysis is the distinction between the 
marginal productivity of an input (a calculus derivative) and the marginal 
productivity associated with the contribution of an individual. This leads to 
a measure-theoretic version of differentiability called product-exhaustion. 
The results on product-exhaustion represent another approach to Euler’s 
Theorem for homogeneous functions. 
The concept of product-exhaustion is equivalent to the no-surplus condi- 
tion in Ostroy [6-81 and Makowski [5], used to characterize perfectly 
competitive equilibrium in alternative economic environments. 
Section 2 of this paper describes the simple production economy, states 
definitions and results, with comments. Proofs are given in Section 3, which 
is mathematically self-contained. 
2. THE MODEL 
2.1. Notations and Conventions 
The euclidean norm and scalar product in W’ will be denoted by I] 1) and 
( , ), respectively. The symbol E, \ E, denotes the difference E, n (CE,) 
of two sets E, and E,. 
For a vector z = (z,, z2,. . . , z,), z >, 0 (resp. z z+ 0) means all zi 2 0 
(resp. all zi > 0), and z > 0 or “z is positive” means z 2 0 and z * 0. 
By measure we mean a (possibly signed) countably additive measure with 
finite values. 
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2.2. Product Exhaustion and Euler’s Theorem 
The notions of a continuum of agents and of their endowments of inputs 
are formalized by a triple (A, 6?, w), where (A, a) is a measurable space, 
w=(v,,vz )...) v,) is a nonatomic I-dimensional vector measure on (A, @) 
with (finite and) positive components v,, . . . , vl. The vector w(A) is called 
the total endowment vector. 
DEFINITION 1. A simple (nonatomic) production economy is a triple 
(A, @, w) as above, together with a (production) function f defined on the 
image Q, = {w(B), B E @} of the vector measure w. 
In this framework the marginalproduct of a set B of agents is f( w(A)) - 
f (w(A \ B)), and it is natural to look for a way of paying an agent its 
marginal product in the same way as the marginal product of factors is said 
to be paid in classical microeconomics. 
Two requirements have to be made on such a possible payment: 
(i) It must be (countably) additive with respect to sets of agents; 
(ii) It must be “close” to the marginal product for “small” or “margi- 
nal” sets of agents. 
This leads to the following definition. 
DEFINITION 2. A (nonatomic) simple production economy (A, &, w, f) 
exhibits product exhaustion ( pe) if the following holds: 
(pe,) Thereexistsameasure~on(A,&)suchthatfor(A,@,w,f,~) 
the following property (A) is true: 
(A) for each 6 > 0, there exists 6 > 0, such that for each 
B E @, 0 -C Ilw(B)II -C 6, we have: 
I/m - (f(wy)BTllf(w(R vwl < E , 
W 
( pe,) the measure p above is positive, 
( pe,) the measure ~1 above fulfills: 
Remark I. Condition (A) is a precise way of saying that the difference 
between payment and marginal product tends to zero faster than the “size” 
of the marginal group, as this group “tends to zero.” 
Remark 2. Condition ( pe,) stipulates that the total output is distributed 
among agents. 
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Remark 3. It is natural to see (A) as meaning that the two maps 
C + p(C) and C + f(w(C)) from @ into R are close on sets close to A, or 
even “tangent at w(A).” 
This is a step toward the next definition. 
DEFINITION 3. A (nonatomic) simple production economy exhibits local 
linearity (N) if the following holds: 
(II,) (Differentiability off at w(A) with respect to P,). There exists a 
vector vf called the gradient off with respect to 8,, such that: 
Em f(z) -f@(A)) - (vf, z - w(A)) = o, 
ZEi-2, llz - w(A)11 r+w(A) 
z*w(A) 
(If,) the vector vf above belongs to the polar cone of C( - Q,) (the 
closed convex cone generated by - a,,,), 
(II,) (Euler’s condition) the vector vf above fulfills: 
Wf~em =fbw). 
The product exhaustion property happens to be equivalent to the dif- 
ferentiability of the production function at the total endowment vector, 
under the proviso of Euler’s condition. Section 3.1 provides the proof of the 
following statement, an unusual characterization of differentiability. 
THEOREM 1. Let (A, &?, w, f) be a (nonatomic) simple production econ- 
omy. For this economy: 
(pe,) ho& ifand only if(U,) holds, 
( pe) holds if and only if (11) holds. 
2.3. Price-Taking Behavior and Euler’s Theorem 
In what can be termed the market-clearing approach (see the definition of 
Walrasian equilibrium, below), prices are regarded as competitively de- 
termined if aggregate demands coincide with aggregate supplies. These 
aggregate schedules represent the summation of demands and supplies by 
individuals each of whom chooses quantities to buy or sell on the ussump- 
tion that prices are unchangeable. The equivalence theorem above obtains 
competitive prices from the condition of product-exhaustion rather than 
market-clearance. An advantage of the product-exhaustion approach is that 
the prices so obtained need not be assumed unchangeable. Price-taking 
behavior-the inability of individual agents to improve the terms of trade 
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upon which they are exchanging-follows from the definition of competi- 
tive equilibrium as product exhaustion. Indeed, it is equivalent to it. 
Here is a formalization of the rationality of price-taking behavior by 
small groups of agents. 
DEFINITION 4. A (nonatomic) simple production economy (A, &, w, f) 
exhibits perfectly elastic equilibrium (pel) if the following holds (with 
w+ = w(A)): 
(pel,) there exists a (price) vector p E W’ such that for each q+> p, 
each q- < p, each a > 0, there exists a neighborhood V of wt = w(A) in G?,, 
such that for each z E V, z * wt: 
f(w+) --f(z) - ,+I+, w+ - z) < cI 
llw+ - 4 9 
f(w+> -f(z) - (4-T w+ - z> > -a 
Ilw+ - 41 
3 
(pel,) the vector p above belongs to the polar cone of C( - a,,,), 
( pel,) the vector p above fulfills 
(PY w(A)) = fMAW 
Remark. The first limit condition means that if the i th input has its 
price raised above pi, there is no hope for a marginal group supplying 
wt - z to sell its endowment vector at this new price q+, since the change in 
output allowed to the other group, f( wt ) - f(z), is definitely not larger than 
the cost of the marginal input, (q+, wt - z). By contrast, any q- smaller 
than p allows any sufficiently small group to sell its endowment. Hence, p 
appears as the best price vector that a marginal group can hope for. 
Section 3.2 provides the proof of the following equivalence theorem. 
THEOREM 2. Let (A, &, w, f) be a (nonatomic) simple production econ- 
omy. For this economy: 
( pel, ) holds if and only if (U,) (or ( pe, )) holds, 
( pel) holds if and only if (N) (or ( pe)) holds. 
Remark. It is not possible to keep the equivalence between (pe) and 
( pel) if, in the definition of (pel,) we restrict the (tentative) price vector q+ 
by the stronger condition q+ > p. Such a restriction would allow for 
another definition of the discrepancy between change in output and change 
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in cost, namely: 
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Km f(4 -f(z) - ccl+, wt - z> < 0 
r-w+ r*w+ wt - 41 
2.4. Global Definitions of Product Exhaustion and Perfect Elasticity 
Rather than looking at the pair (w, f) as we did, it is more usual to 
consider the technology as given, independently of the possible resource 
distributions. This leads to definitions of product exhaustion and perfectly 
elastic equilibrium properties for production functions, defined on the 
whole of W :. 
DEFINITION 5. A (production) function F defined on BP!+ exhibits global 
product exhaustion (GPE) (resp. global perfect elasticity (GPEL)) if for 
each nonatomic W!+-valued measure w  on a measurable space (A, &), with 
w(A) B 0, the nonatomic simple production economy (A, &, w, f 1 n,) fulfills 
(P) (rev. WN. 
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 will be used in Section 3.3 to prove their 
following global counterpart. 
THEOREM 3. Let F be a (production) function defined on W\, whose 
restrictions to each ray W*, - m, m >> 0, is continuous. Then F furfills (GPE) 
or equivalently (GPEL), if and only if it is differentiable and homogeneous of 
degree one on in@!+), the gradient VF being everywhere positive. 
Remark 1. The continuity assumption concerns the restrictions of F to 
the various rays. It cannot be dispensed with as is shown by the example 
1 = 1, F(t) = t if 0 d t G 1, F(t) = 2t for t > 1. 
Remark 2. The example I= 2, F((t,, t2)) = (tf + tz)‘/’ shows that su- 
peradditivity (i.e., F( t + t’) > F(t) + F( t’)) cannot be deduced from (GPE) 
or (GPEL). 
Remark 3. The theorem can be called a new version of Euler’s theorem. 
It differs from results of one of the authors [7, 81 by the fact that no 
concavity or superadditivity assumption is made in either (GPE) or (GPEL). 
Note that for any function F: BP’++ BP, one may construct its superadditive 
envelope F* defined by 
p(m) = sup( DImi)), 
where the sup ranges over all possible decompositions of m = Cmi into 
finitely many positive vectors mi. Thus, if the original technology F is 
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commonly available to all groups of agents, it may be reproduced so that 
the observed technological relation between inputs and output is the super- 
additive Fr. 
2.5. Comparison with Walrasian Equilibrium 
Let (A, @, w, f) be a nonatomic simple production economy for which f 
is the restriction to St, of a (production) function F defined on R:. One has 
to define a Walrasian equilibrium for the economy as a (price) vector p such 
that, taking p as given, there is no reason for the agents as a whole to 
consider an input vector other than w(A); under the qualification F( w( A)) 
= (p, w(A)) one must have: 
F(w(A)) - (P+(A)) = sup (F(z) - (P, 4). 
ZER: 
The existence of p appears as a property of F, highlighted in the next 
definition. 
DEFINITION 6. A (production) function F: R ‘+ + R exhibits Walrasian 
equilibrium (we) at m > 0, if there exists a (price) vector p E Iw’+ such that 
(we,) for each z E W:, F(z) d (p, z), 
(wed F(m) = (P, m). 
Remark 1. This definition is similar to the definition of the subgradient 
of a concave function. The following will elaborate on this similarity and 
present (part of) the distinction between ( pe) and (we) as the distinction 
between gradient and subgradient. 
Remark 2. Under (we) the output is distributed according to p = ( p, w). 
Remark3. Under(we)atm,foranyeconomy(A,@,w)withw(A)=m, 
compatibility conditions are fulfilled since demand for inputs by the econ- 
omy is equal to supply, and demand for output is equal to its supply. 
Our last equivalence result is preferably stated in two parts. 
PROPOSITION 1. Let F: Iw ’+ + 04, with F(0) = 0, be a function fulfilling 
one of the properties: 
(a) F exhibits (we) at each m > 0, 
(b) F exhibits (we) at each m x=- 0 and is continuous at each m > 0, 
m + 0. 
Then F is positive, homogeneous of degree one and superadditive (hence 
concave)on W/,. 
PROPOSITION 2. Let F: R !+ + R +, with F(0) = 0 be a superadditive 
function, homogeneous of degree one. Then F fulfills (we) at each m >S 0. If F 
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is moreover locally Lipschitz for each m > 0, m + 0, then F fulfills (we) at 
each m > 0. 
It is well known that a homogeneous, superadditive function on R: has a 
gradient almost everywhere on the interior of W\. Thus Proposition 10 
allows us to say that, for a technology (the F function) with (we) every- 
where, one has ( pe) almost everywhere. Exceptions occur precisely in those 
economies (A, &, w) in which the price-taking assumption of (we) at w(A) 
cannot be rationalized-i.e., when (we) is not a perfectly elastic equi- 
librium. 
3. THE PROOFS 
3.1. Proof of Theorem 1 
(a) If (N,) holds, we define x by: 
and (pe,) just follows from rewriting (U,). 
(b) We note that in (a) above, the scalar measure ~1 is a linear 
combination of the components of the vector measure w. Hence, to prove 
that (If,) follows from (pe,), we shall first show (in (e), below) that under 
(pe,), the set of all (w(B), p(B)), B E a, is contained in an hyperplane of 
R’ x w. 
(c) If a measure p (positive or not) fulfills property (A) (see the 
definition of ( pe,)), then it is absolutely continuous with respect to w. Since 
w  is nonatomic, there exists indeed for each N E &, N * 0, with w(N) = 0, 
an increasing sequence (Ak)k of elements of 6?, such that: 
. forallk,A,nN= la,w(A,)~w(A)inR’; 
. . lipw(A,) = w(A). 
Let B, = (A \ N)\A,, kk = B, U N. We have: 
. w(&) = w(4); 
. . lipw( Bk) = 0; 
. . . CL(&) = CL(~) + P(N). 
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We apply property (A) to both sequences (B,), and (6k)k, to get: 
lim P(B/o - (fbJ(4) -fbo MC))) = (-J 
IlW(Bk)ll 
9 
li”, !-Qk) - (fb(4) -.fb@ W)) = 0 
> 
k IIw(‘k)ll 
hence we find: 
which surely implies p(N) = 0, and the absolute continuity of p with 
respect to w. 
(d) From (c) it follows that the vector measure (w, p) is nonatomic. 
(e) If a measure p fulfills property (A), we know, by Lyapunov’s 
theorem, that the image 6 of the nonatomic vector measure (w, p) is a 
(closed) convex set in lF4’ x R. We just have to show that fi has the same 
dimension as its “horizontal” projection Q,,, on R’, to know that 6? is 
contained in a nonvertical homogeneous hyperplane of R’ x R. 
If fi had a larger dimension than 52, we would then (see Fig. 1) find two 
different segments [y, y+], [y’, y+] in 0, with the same projection [w*, wt] 
on Q, where y + = (w+, x+), x+ = p(A), and where w* would be in the 
relative interior of Q. 
Let us consider a family (B,), z E [w*, w+] of elements of @, such that 
(w( B,), p( B,)) converges to (w+, x+) along the first segment, as z converges 
to w+ on [w*, w+]. 
The property (A) allows to compute the ratio ( f( w+) - f(z))/]] w+ - z]] in 
terms of p, when z = w(B,). More precisely, the limit of this ratio as z 
tends to w+, z E [w*, wt], is given by the common value of all the 
P(A \ B,Mlw(A \ B,>ll, i.e. (see Fig. 11, by (xt - Z)/llwi - w*ll. 
Using again property (A) and the second segment, we would find as limit 
the number (x+ - <‘)/I] w+ - w*]J. From 5 f .$’ we get a contradiction. Both 
Q and fi have the same dimension. 
(f) We note that several homogeneous hyperplanes do contain h if the 
dimension of 51 is smaller than 1, but in any case there exists at most one 
measure p fulfilling the property (A). It is of the form (p, w), where p is 
determined up to any vector in R’ orthogonal to $2. 
(g) From (pel) it follows, by (f), that the ratio 
(P,w(B)) - (fb+> -fb(B))) 
Ilw@>II 
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FIG. 1. An impossible shape for Q,, under (pe,). 
“tends to zero as w(B) tends to wi,” which is the differentiability off at wt, 
with respect to P,, withp as a gradient. 
(h) The equivalence of ( pe,) and (II,) proves the equivalence of ( pe) 
and (II). 
3.2. Proof of Theorem 2 
(a) From (11,) with a gradient p off at wt with respect to P,, it follows 
that for each a > 0, there exists a neighborhood Y of wt in Q,,, such that for 
z E 52,, z * w+: 
f(z) -fW - (P, z - 4 El 
lb - w+ll 
hence: 
- a, +a[, 
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When q+> p we find that a is a majoration of the ratio in the definition 
of ( pel,). The proof works in a similar way for q- < p. 
(b) If (II,) is not fulfilled, then for each p E BP’ there exists a > 0, 
p E { - 1, + l}, and a sequence (z~)~ in 52, \ {wt} such that: 
. limz, = w+, 
n 
w+ - z 
. . d=lim n exists, 
” lb+ - Z”ll 
. . . foralln, f(zJ -f(w+) - (P, Z” - w+> > 2a (resp < -24 
II% - w+ll 
3 
ifu= I(resp.u= -1). 
Let us suppose for instance u = - 1. Define q+= p + ad > p, and study: 
r = r(w+) -f(z,> - +I+, w+ - zn) 
n 
IF+ - z,ll 
We find that: 
rn > 2a - 
1 
qf- p, 
w+ - z 
IN+ - 4 ’ ) 
hence: 
For n large enough, a/2 will be a minoration of r,,, and (p, a/2, q+, (z,),) 
will not satisfy the first inequality in the definition of ( pel,). 
(c) The equivalence of (N,) and (pel,) proves the equivalence of (II) 
and ( pel). 
3.3. Proof of Theorem 3 
From GPE (resp. GPEL) we know by Theorem 1 (resp. Theorem 2) that 
for each m E R: the function F is differentiable at m with respect to the set 
{z E W:, 0 K z Q m}. This is a generalization of the notion of left-hand 
derivability. In particular, the function g(X) = f(Am), X > 0, is left-hand 
derivable and g’(h) = (l/A)g(h) for all X > 0. Assuming that F(m) > 0, 
we can define k(h) = Ln(g(X)/X) around X = 1: this is a continuous 
function with a zero left-hand derivative around A = 1, hence g is linear 
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around h = 1. We use again the continuity of F to get its homogeneity of 
degree one, on the whole ray Rt. m and on the whole of int(R!+). 
It remains to use the newly proved homogeneity, to get differentiability of 
F in the usual sense. This is done in the next proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3. Let F be a function homogeneous of degree one in a 
neighborhood V of m, m ZZ=- 0 in a!+. If f d’ff IS I eren la t’ bl e at m with respect to 
V f~ (m - W :}, then it is differentiable at m. 
Proof. Let p be the gradient of F at m with respect to V f~ (m - R\}, 
and let g be the function: 
g(z) = IF(z) - F(m) - (P, z - m>l 
Ilz--II ’ 
for z E V, z f m. 
It follows from the assumptions that F(m) = (p, m) and that for each 
e > 0, there exists 6 > 0 such that g(z) < f for each z * m in the box B 
defined by (see Fig. 2): 
B = (~10 Q m - z Q (a,..., 8)). 
LetDbethesetofallzinBforwhichzi=miforsomei= l,...,I.We 
are looking for a majoration of g on 
C=BU co<y<*(l + a)D)T . 
which is a neighborhood of m in R:. 
Since F is locally homogeneous of degree one, we have for z E D: 
g((l + a)z) = I(1 + am) - (1 + 4(P, z>l 
II@ + 4~ - Ml ’ 
As a first majoration of g on C we find the product of E by Ilz - mll/llz - 
m/(1 + a)lI. This last ratio can be written 
I(m + (z - m)(( l’+ cy)/2a) - ml1 ll(m - z)(l + ~)/W 
ljrn + (z - m)(( 1 + a)/2a) - m/211 = ll(m - z)((l + a)/2a) - m/211 ’ 
which is of the form Ilull/llu - a(1 with a >) 0 and u in the boundary of W!+. 
The last expression remains bounded above as, a being fixed, u moves in 
a@!+). Hence g(x)/r is bounded above as x moves in the neighborhood C 
of m, which ensures the differentiability of F at m. 
- 
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FIG. 2. From “South-West” to usual differentiability at tn. 
3.4. Proof of Proposition 1 
For each m where (we) holds for some p E R ‘,, define 
H,,, = {(z, t) E R’ X R; ((p, - l), (z, t)) 2 ((P, - I), (m,‘F(m)))}. 
We find that 
(9 Cm, F(m)) E fL 
(ii) H,,, is a convex cone, since (p, m) = F(m), 
(iii) for each z E R:, (z, F(z)) E H,, 
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(iv) H,,, is W _ stable, i.e., if (z, t) E H, then (z, t - u) E H,,, for each 
u 2 0. 
It follows from (iii) and (iv) that the subgraph ?7= {(z, t) E R’+x IR; 
t < F(z)} of the function F, is contained in X = n m H,, and that ‘$and X 
have the same intersection with each vertical line {m} X Iw for which (we) 
holds at m, and the same intersection with (0) X R. 
Under assumption a) we conclude that B = X, and that F is a concave 
function on 89 !+, homogeneous of degree one on 08 ‘, . 
Under the first assumption of b) we get the same concavity and homo- 
geneity conclusions on the interior of W:. The continuity assumption 
ensures the concavity and homogeneity on R\\(O). These properties are 
then valid on the whole of W: since F(0) = 0. 
Up to now we did not use the positivity of the vectors p in (we). It 
ensures the positivity of F since F(m) = (p, m) for each m B 0. 
3.5. Proof of Proposition 2 
The function F: R!++ Iw,, being homogeneous of degree one and 
superadditive, is concave and we apply the concepts and results of [9] to the 
convex function G defined by: 
G(z) = -F(z) if z 20, G(z) = + cc otherwise. 
We first get from the homogeneity of F that each possible subgradient z* 
of G at z fulfills the equality G(z) = (z*, z). Then for m interior to lR’+ and 
-p a subgradient of G at m [9, Theorem 23.41 we have for each z: 
F(z) < F(m) + (p, z - m). 
From F being positive, we get that p E R +, and (we) holds at m. 
Would G have no subgradient at m = (a,, . . . , ai, 0,. . . , 0), 0 < i < 1, 
uj > 0 for 1 <j d i, we should have, by Theorem 23.3 of [9], G’(m; y) = 
- 00 for y, with first i coordinates zero and the last 1 - i coordinates equal 
to 1. This is in contradiction with the assumption of F being locally 
Lipschitzian at m. That (we) holds for F at m is then shown as in the case 
m >> 0. 
Remark. We used part of the Lipschitzian property in the weakest 
sense: at m there exists a c such that IF(z) - F(m) 1 < cllz - ml1 for each z 
close to m. 
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